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After the global financial crisis that resulted from the
bursting of the US housing bubble in 2006 and the
default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, a
number of countries on the eurozone’s south-western
periphery, in particular Greece, Spain, Portugal and
Ireland, have faced severe difficulties involving the
risk of sovereign debt defaults and a new banking cri-
sis. Other EU countries, above all France, were indi-
rectly affected by this crisis, and in addition some
eastern European countries are endangered.
Although the EU has tried to contain the euro crisis
with extensive rescue operations that have turned the
no-bail out philosophy of the Maastricht Treaty on its
head, in summer 2010 the danger was not yet over.
Obviously, the construction of the eurozone, in par-
ticular the rules of conduct for the participating coun-
tries, needs to be reconsidered.
This does not mean that the euro should be given
up. The euro itself is indispensible for Europe.
During the financial crisis it has protected its mem-
bers from internal exchange rate shocks, it has
reduced the European transactions costs for trade,
and it is a necessary ingredient of further European
integration.
Nevertheless, in this essay, I argue that the euro has
not been as beneficial for all European countries as
has often been claimed. The euro has shifted Europe’s
growth forces from the center to the periphery. It has
not been particularly beneficial for Germany, for
example, and because of a lack of proper private and
public debt constraints, it has stimulated the periph-
ery of Europe up to the point of overheating, with
ultimately dangerous consequences for European
cohesion. The current crisis has not put an end to this
development. It has flipped a toggle switch that will
shift the forces of growth back from the periphery to
the center, although the rescue measures counteract
this. I criticize these measures because of the moral
hazard effects they generate and propose a new polit-
ical design for a more prosperous and stable develop-
ment of the eurozone. In a sense, this essay can be
understood as a new chapter of my Oxford University
Press book, Casino Capitalism, which had already
gone to press and could not take full account of the
European crisis.1
The rescue measures
During the night of 9/10 May 2010 in Brussels, the
EU countries agreed a 500 billion euro rescue pack-
age for endangered member countries, assuming that
supplementary help, to the order of 250 billion
euros, would come from the IMF.2 The pact came in
addition to the 80-billion-euro rescue plan for
Greece, topped by 30 billion euros from the IMF,
that had been agreed previously,3 and it was supple-
mented by the ECB decision to participate in the
bailout of endangered countries by buying govern-
ment bonds.
The rescue package consists of two parts: A 60-bil-
lion-euro loan facility, called European Financial
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), empowering the
EU Council to borrow in the capital market, after a
majority decision, and lend to endangered EU coun-
tries inside and outside the eurozone, and a further
440-billion-euro package for euro countries granted in
the form of intergovernmental help. The funds need-
ed are to be borrowed in the market by a newly
formed special purpose vehicle of the euro states,
called European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),
and to be transferred to the countries in crisis at mar-
ket interest rates. The EFSF is located in Luxembourg
and is supported by the European Investment Bank.
* Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
1 H.-W. Sinn, Casino Capitalism, How the Financial Crisis Came
about and What Needs to Be Done Now, Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2010. 
2 The European Stabilization Mechanism, Council Regulation (EU)
No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial sta-
bilisation mechanism, online at www.eur-lex.europa.eu, 7 July 2010;
EFSF Framework Agreement, 7 June 2010, online at www.bundesfi-
nanzministerium.de, 5 July 2010.
3 Statement by the Eurogroup, Brussels, 2 May 2010, and IMF
Reaches Staff-level Agreement with Greece on €30 Billion Stand-By
Arrangement, IMF Press Release No. 10/176.It works in close cooperation with the European
Commission. The bonds it issues to the market are
jointly guaranteed by the euro states. 
The decisions are reminiscent of the eurobonds (com-
munity bonds) to be issued by the European
Investment Bank that the Italian Minister of Finance
Tremonti already called for at the World Economic
Forum in Davos in 2009.4 But whereas Tremonti
wanted the eurobonds to be used for the normal
financing of the euro states, the EFSF is motivated by
the idea of crisis prevention, applying to countries
that face financial difficulties due to extraordinary cir-
cumstances beyond their control.5
Surprisingly, the framework document is rather vague
about the formal procedure to identify such extraor-
dinary circumstances. It states that the European
Commission will negotiate a fiscal consolidation pro-
gram if a country applies for help and that this pro-
gram will then have to be unanimously accepted by all
euro countries, but it does not say who will have to
define the extraordinary circumstances to initiate EU
actions.6 The vagueness has prompted some to think
that the money is available on demand. The German
law implementing the EFSF puts a stop to such inter-
pretation. It states that help can only be provided as
an emergency measure to preserve a country’s solven-
cy, and it defines a clear sequence for the procedure to
be followed after a country has applied for help.7
First, all euro states (excluding the endangered coun-
try or countries), the ECB and the IMF must unani-
mously agree on the looming insolvency. Then the
European Commission and the IMF, in cooperation
with the ECB, will negotiate a consolidation plan with
the country that is requesting help. And, finally, this
plan will have to be unanimously accepted by all euro
countries (including the endangered countries). Given
that the EFSF was formed by an international treaty
outside the EU, Germany’s interpretation is binding
for the German government and cannot be overruled
by EU bodies. 
There also was substantial confusion as to the vol-
ume of guarantees to be provided by the single euro
countries. At first glance the EFSF Framework
Agreement says that each state is to guarantee an
amount proportional to 120 percent of its ECB cap-
ital share. This rule was obviously meant to cover
the worst case, in which Greece, Portugal, Spain and
Ireland would all become needy, for 120 percent of
the ECB capital shares of the other euro countries
applied to the 440 billion euros would then be exact-
ly 441 billion euros. However, the exact formulations
of the Framework Agreement differ from this inter-
pretation. On the one hand, § 5(1)a and § 8(2) stipu-
late that each country’s ECB share is scaled up by
allocating the shares of the ‘stepping-out guaran-
tors’ to the other countries and that the 120 percent
is then applied to this scaled-up percentage.8 The
logical implication is that in the extreme, when all
countries but one step out, this one country would
have to guarantee 120 percent of 440 billion euros,
i.e. 528 billion euros, single-handedly. On the other
hand, § 2.3, in conjunction with Appendix 1, limits
each country’s guarantee to an absolute amount
that equals this country’s ECB capital share times
440 billion euros, which is an obvious contradiction.
For France this would limit the liability to 90 billion
euros and for Germany to 119 billion euros. The
confusion must have lead to further negotiations
after the agreement was signed, as the actual formu-
lations that the European countries implemented in
their respective national laws imply yet another rule.
France and Germany, for example, stipulated in
their respective national laws that they would at
most guarantee 120 percent of the capital share
adjusted for Greece, as the Agreement treated
Greece as a stepping out guarantor from the outset.9
In the case of France, this is 25.2 percent (120 per-
cent of 21.0 percent) or 111 billion euros, and in the
case of Germany, 33.5 percent (120 percent of
27.9 percent) or 147 billion euros.10 Thus, the two
countries do not respect the scaling-up of their
guarantee percentages for countries stepping out in
addition to Greece, as § 5(1) and § 8(2) require, but
they guarantee more than the upper limits following
from § 2.3 and Appendix 1. 
As in the case of Greece, Germany attempted to make
the participation of the IMF a precondition for the
assistance provided by the EFSF. It succeeded to the
extent that the IMF must take part in determining the
insolvency, and that it must approve the consolidation
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4 “Now my feeling – I am speaking of a political issue not at economic
issue – is […] now we need a union bond”, Tremonti commented,
according to Businessweek, at the World Economic Forum in
Davos(www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2009/gb2009022
_614778.htm).
5 EFSF Framework Agreement, Preamble (1).
6 EFSF Framework Agreement, § 2(1).
7 Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines
europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus, online at www.bgbl.de,
7 July 2010.
8 EFSF Framework Agreement, § 5(1) in conjunction with § 8(2). 
9 EFSF Framework Agreement, § 8(2)
10 See Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines
europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus, 22 May 2010, § 1(1) and § 1(6),
online at www.bgbl.de, 7 July 2010. Loi n° 2010-606 du 7 juin 2010 de
finances rectificative pour 2010, § 3(I), online at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.CESifo Forum 2010 3
Special Issue
plan. However, the financial par-
ticipation of the IMF in the res-
cue package is not a firm condi-
tion as in the case of Greece. It is
only ‘anticipated’.
In addition to the rescue mea-
sures for Greece, the 60-billion-
euro EU loan program, and the
440-billion-euro program run by
the EFSF, the ECB also allowed
itself to be included in the new
rescue program. Making use of a
loophole in the Maastricht
Treaty, it decided on 12 May 2010
to buy government securities for
the first time in its history,
instead of only acknowledging
them as collateral.11 This was
seen by many observers as a fun-
damental contradiction to the
interpretation of the Maastricht
Treaty as a stability union that it
thus far had endorsed. And what
is more: while the ECB had required at least a ‘A’- rat-
ing for the government bonds it accepted as collateral
in the years before the crisis and a ‘BBB’- rating dur-
ing the crisis, it waived the rating requirement for its
direct purchase program in order to be able to buy
Greek government bonds, which had been given junk-
bond status by the rating agencies. In December 2009
the ECB had given assurances that it would not even
accept such securities as collateral, and that it would
return to a ‘A’- rating requirement by the end of
2010.12 The representatives of Germany and the
Netherlands, who together hold 33 percent of the
euro country shares of the ECB but only 14 percent of
the voting rights, were outvoted on this decision.
The ECB decision does not incur the risk of inflation
because the ECB announced that it will neutralize the
monetary effect through other means, presumably
through the sale of private-sector assets from its port-
folio. Indeed, the purchase of state bonds has little to
do with monetary policy, but is a pure bailing-out,
transferring the default risk on government bonds from
banks to the ECB and hence to the euro states’ taxpay-
ers. If a default occurs, this will either reduce the prof-
it transfers to the respective national finance ministries
or force the national governments to re-inject new equi-
ty into the ECB. Germany will shoulder 27.13 percent
of all default losses and France 20.38 percent (accord-
ing to their respective ECB capital shares).
Table 1 gives an overview of the exposures of the
community of all countries as well as France and
Germany. It is assumed here that Germany and
France guarantee the 60-billion-euro EU loans at
their respective shares in the EU budget, which are
20.0 percent and 16.2 percent respectively. Similarly,
these countries participate with their respective capi-
tal shares of 5.98 percent and 4.94 percent in the
IMF funds provided. The next-to-last line gives the
bail-out guarantees implicit in the 60 billion ECB
purchases of state bonds by 30 July 2010. While the
ECB has not announced how large its own bail-out
package is, the time trend suggests that the 60 billion
euros will be the limit of government bond purchas-
es for the time being.
According to the table, the bail-out guarantee of all
programs taken together by 30 July 2010 was 920 bil-
lion euros. This is slightly less than the aggregate gov-
ernment debt of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland,
which was 1,064 billion euros by the end of 2009. Of
the overall bail-out guarantee, Germany and France
together bear 378 billion euros, or 41 percent of the
total. 
11 ECB Decides on Measures to Address Severe Tensions in Financial
Markets, ECB Press Release of 10 May 2010 
(http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html). 
12 Guideline of the European Central Bank of 10th December 2009,
online at www.ecb.int, 9 July 2010.
 
Table 1 
The rescue packages and the liability limits (billion euro) 
  All 
countries 
Germany  France 
European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF)  440  147.4  110.7 
European Financial Stability 
Mechanism 
(EFSM, European Commission)  60  12.0  9.7 
IMF euro rescue plan  250  14.9  12.3 
EU rescue plan for Greece  80  22.3  16.8 
IMF rescue plan for Greece  30  1.8  1.5 
ECB purchases of government 
bonds (up to 30 July 2010)  60  16.4  12.3 
Sum  920  214.9  163.3 
Notes: Line 1: ECB capital shares (euro countries except Greece), in-
creased by 20%. Line 2: 2008 shares in EU Budget. Line 3: Current IMF 
capital shares (5.98% for Germany and 4.94% for France). Line 4: ECB 
capital shares (euro countries without Greece). Line 5: as line 3. Line 6: 
ECB capital shares (euro countries). 
Sources:  EFSF Framework Agreement, 7 June 2010, online at 
www.bundesfinanzministerium.de, 5 July 2010; EU, The European Stabili- 
zation Mechanism, Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 
establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, online at   
www.eur-lex.europa.eu, 7 July 2010; European Commission, EU Budget, 2008 
Financial Report (Luxembourg 2009), p. 67; ECB, 1 January 2009 – Adjust-
ments to the ECB´s Capital Subscription Key and the Contribution Paid by 
Slovakia, Press release 1 January 2009; IMF, Updated IMF Quota Data – June 
2010, online at www.imf.org, 5 July 2010. Calculations by the Ifo Institute.  
 French altruism
Prima facie the rescue packages have helped the
endangered countries, namely Greece, Spain, Portugal
and Ireland, whose outstanding government bonds
had fallen in value mirroring a dramatic increase in
the interest rates these countries had to offer the mar-
kets as compensation for an expected default. In fact,
however, the absence of a ‘haircut’ that would have
imposed some of the burden of default on the credi-
tors makes it clear that the rescue measures were moti-
vated not solely by altruism, but by the attempt to
avoid write-off losses in the respective national bank
balance sheets. This aspect made the rescue measures
a means of redistributing wealth between the creditor
countries and caused enormous pressure, tension and
friction. 
The negotiations of 7–9 May 2010 that lead to the rein-
terpretation of the Maastricht Treaty must have been
difficult, if not chaotic. Since rescue measures beyond
the pre-arranged Greek package had not been on the
agenda for the Brussels meeting, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel thought she could safely go to Moscow
to commemorate the end of World War II – unlike
President Sarkozy, who declined Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin’s invitation. Angela Merkel
participated on Friday, 7 May, when the rescue package
was added to the agenda. She was able to influence
important preliminary decisions, but she had already
committed to go to Moscow and returned to the meet-
ings only on Sunday afternoon. Worse, the leader of
the German delegation to the EU meeting, Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, fell ill and had to be
taken to hospital in Brussels. This left the German del-
egation temporarily headless until Thomas de
Maizière, Germany’s Minister of
the Interior was brought in to
replace him. French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, in contrast, was
fully active during the meeting.
He asked for huge sums of money
and, as Spanish Prime Minister
José Luis Zapatero reported,
threatened to pull France out of
the euro and break up the Franco-
German axis unless Germany
opened its purse.13 After just two
days of negotiations, the Maas-
tricht Treaty’s no-bailout clause, which Germany once
had made a condition for giving up the Deutsche
Mark, was defunct. 
France’s implacability, in Germany’s political cir-
cles widely perceived as recklessness, can be
explained by the fact that its banks were affected
particularly strongly by the crisis, since they held a
large volume of government securities of troubled
countries. By the end of 2009, French banks had
invested 21 billion euros in Greek government
bonds, whereas German banks had invested only
16 billion euros.14 Similarly, as Figure 1 reveals, at
the same time French banks were holding substan-
tially more debt issued by the governments of
Spain, Portugal and Ireland, totaling 52 billion
euros, than banks of any other EU country. Even
German banks only had an exposure of 32 billion
euros. Figure 1 suggests why President Sarkozy was
so determined to organize the rescue packages and
was even willing to sacrifice the Franco-German
axis to achieve his goals.
From a French perspective it was definitely preferable
to opt for collective rescue measures, as this implied
that some of the over-proportional burden expected
for their own banks would have to be shared by other
countries, above all Germany. While Germany con-
tributes one third (33 percent) more to the rescue
packages for Spain, Portugal and Ireland than France,
France’s exposure is two-thirds (65 percent) higher
than Germany’s. 
CESifo Forum 2010 4
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14 Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, June
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The situation at first glance seems a bit less extreme
with regard to Greece. While Germany again con-
tributes a third more to the rescue package for Greece
than France, the French exposure to Greek govern-
ment bonds exceeds the German one only by one
third (34 percent). However, it is worth noting that
French banks own a non-negligible share of the
Greek banking system. For example, French bank
Crédit Agricole is the owner of Emporiki Bank,
Greek’s fourth-largest commercial bank. 
After the rescue measures, it comes as no surprise that
not a single French bank failed the EU stress test for
banks published on 23 July 2010.15 While the French
banking system had weathered the US financial crisis
well, because it was not overly exposed to US assets,16
it would have been hit fully by the southern European
debt crisis, had the rescue measures not been taken.
With these measures in place, passing the test was not
a problem. As European banks held the lion’s shares
of their southern government bonds in their banking
rather than trading books, they did not have to report
the diminished market values of these bonds in the
stress tests, but were allowed to evaluate them at their
nominal face values, arguing that they planned to
hold them to maturity and that the European rescue
measures would guarantee the repayment. 
Was the euro really endangered?
Politicians claimed and obviously believed that the
bailouts were necessary to prevent a systemic crisis of
the euro. There was no alternative to a bailout over the
weekend of 8 and 9 May 2010, it was argued, for the
financial markets were in such disarray that Europe’s
financial system, if not the western world’s, would
have collapsed had the rescue packages not been
agreed immediately, before the stock market in Tokyo
was to open on Monday morning, 2 am Brussels time.
The similarity to the collapse of the interbank market
after the insolvency of Lehman Brothers on 15 Sep-
tember 2008 seemed all too obvious. 
The official documents also argue along this line. The
EFSF Framework Agreement, the EU Council regu-
lation for the 60-billion-euro package and, for exam-
ple, the official recommendations that the German
government gave to its Parliament, all repeat the for-
mulations of Article 122 of the EU Treaty, according
to which assistance by EU countries is allowed if
member states are threatened with serious difficulties
that are beyond their control.17 Up to recently, this
formulation had always been interpreted as not being
applicable to the bailing-out of debtors. However, the
euro governments now explicitly based the bailout
actions on it arguing that the debt crisis endangered
the solvency of entire states and posed a serious threat
to the financial stability of the monetary union itself.
Leading EU politicians changed their language over
the weekend of 8/9 May, reinterpreting what formerly
were debt crises of particular countries as a ‘systemic
crisis’ that could also endanger countries that had not
violated the rules. The euro itself was endangered.
The Euro Group chairman, Jean-Claude Juncker,
spoke of a ‘worldwide organised attack against the
euro’.18 Chancellor Merkel and French President
Sarkozy stressed in a joint declaration that “we must
prevent speculators from endangering the adjustment
efforts that have become necessary because of the
recently overcome economic and financial crisis”.19
Chancellor Merkel said that the future of the euro
was at risk,20 and she warned in her speech at the cer-
emony awarding the Charlemagne Prize in Aachen:
“If the euro fails, […] then Europe will fail, then the
idea of European integration will fail”.21 Both French
President Sarkozy and ECB President Jean-Claude
Trichet spoke of a systemic crisis.22 “The euro faces a
systemic crisis. Thus a systemic answer is needed”,
said President Sarkozy.23
The euro was evidently endangered politically,
because President Sarkozy had played for high stakes.
The question, however, is whether the euro was also
endangered economically, or what could have been
meant by talk of such a threat other than the losses
threatening the holders of the government bonds. If
write-offs had to be accepted on government securi-
ties, which were purchased out of a profit motive, it
seems a bit odd to claim to be beset by dangers
15 See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2010 EU Wide
Stress Testing, Summary of the 91 bank-by-bank results, pp. 11–14.
16 See H.-W. Sinn, Casino Capitalism, op. cit., chapter 8. 
17 EFSF Framework Agreement, op. cit., preamble (1). Council
Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010, Official Journal of the European
Union, 11 May 2010, online at www.eur-lex.europa.eu, 9 July 2010.
Beschlussempfehlung des Haushaltsausschusses (8. Ausschuss) zu dem
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP – Drucksache
17/1685, Deutscher Bundestag.
18 Euroländer sagen Spekulanten den Kampf an, Spiegel Online of
8 May 2010, www.spiegel.de.
19 Joint Communiqué of Chancellor Merkel and French President
Sarkozy to the Presidents of the European Council and the European
Commission, Press Release of the German Federal Government of
6. May 2010, www.bundesregierung.de.
20 Protecting the Euro, News Item of the German Federal
Government of 10 May 2010 www.bundesregierung.de.
21 Kämpfer für Europa, News Item of the German Federal
Government of 13 May 2010 www.bundesregierung.de.
22 EZB soll direkt Staatsanleihen kaufen, FAZ.NET, 10 May 2010,
www.faz.net.
23 Handelsblatt Online, Euro-Rettungsbeschluss soll Spekulanten zäh-
men, 9 May 2010, www.handelsblatt.com.beyond one’s control, in order to
be able to invoke Article 122 of
the EU Treaty. So other dangers
must have been lurking. 
A possible hypothesis could
have been that the euro was in
danger of losing much of its
internal and external value in
this crisis. However, there is lit-
tle empirical evidence of such a
development.
A look at Figure 2 shows that the
euro was not endangered in
terms of uncontrolled exchange-
rate movements. On Friday,
7 May 2010, the last trading day before the agreement,
one euro cost 1.27 dollars. This was indeed less than
in previous months but much more than the 0.88 dol-
lars which were the average of January and February
2002, when the euro currency was physically intro-
duced. 
An objective measurement of a currency’s value is the
OECD purchasing power parity. The purchasing
power parity is a kind of natural exchange rate, as it
equates the cost of an average goods basket in the
considered countries. The purchasing power parity is
shown as a blue line in Figure 2. Since it recently
stood at 1.17 dollars, it is not possible to talk of the
euro being endangered on this basis. If the euro was
endangered, it was because of the official announce-
ment made for legal reasons that the euro was facing
a systemic crisis. As the figure shows, after the decla-
ration of the rescue packages for a while the exchange
rate even kept declining. 
Figure 3 further shows that there were no indications
of an unexpectedly strong decline in domestic pur-
chasing power because of inflation. Most recently, in
July 2010, the inflation rate in the euro area amount-
ed to 1.7 percent. That was one of the lowest rates
since the introduction of the euro. It was also much
lower than the inflation rate of the Deutsche Mark
during its 50 years of existence, which averaged
2.7 percent between 1948 and 1998. In this respect as
well there was no evident danger.
The euro obviously was not endangered in this crisis.
Endangered was the French banking system, as well
as the ability of the countries of Europe’s south-west-
ern periphery to continue financing themselves as
cheaply in the capital markets as
had been possible in the initial
years of the euro. The next sec-
tion will try to shed some light on
this issue.
The true problem: rising interest
spreads
The decline in the market value
of government bonds during the
crisis that so upset President
Sarkozy was equivalent to an
increase in the effective interest
rates on these bonds. In Figure 4
the development of interest rates
is plotted for ten-year govern-
ment bonds of the euro states
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since 1994. Evidently, the interest rate spreads were
rising rapidly during the financial crisis, as shown on
the right-hand side of the diagram. No doubt, there
was some danger, but it was danger to very specific
countries rather than a systemic danger of the euro
system as such. Apart from France, which was indi-
rectly affected via its banks’ ownership of problemat-
ic state bonds, the endangered countries include
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (and to a
limited extent Belgium), if the criterion is the increase
in interest rates in recent months. The countries that
were neither in danger via their creditor banks nor in
terms of increasing interest rates included Germany,
the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 
However, apart from Greece, even for the countries
directly affected the danger was limited. As the fig-
ure shows, interest spreads relative to Germany had
been much more problematic before the euro was
introduced. In 1995, Italy, Portugal and Spain on
average had had to pay 5.0 percentage points higher
interest rates on ten-year government bonds than
Germany. 
Among the reasons for the spreads at that time was
the non-existence of a common European capital
market, because fluctuating exchange rates and
transactions costs created a large burden for interna-
tional investments and kept the markets apart, but
arguably the expectation of systematic currency
devaluations was even more important. While inter-
national investors who bought a country’s govern-
ment bonds may not have been afraid that the debtor
countries would formally default on their debt, they
were afraid that these countries would implicitly
default by deliberately inflating
and devaluing their currencies.
The expected losses resulting
from the inflation-cum-devalua-
tion strategy had to be compen-
sated for by interest surcharges
that the debtor countries offered
their creditors for both public
and private loans, bonds and
debentures.
As it was known that the ex-
change risk and transactions
costs would disappear with the
euro, the interest rates began to
converge as soon as a country
was expected to become a mem-
ber of the eurozone and once no
further exchange rate realign-
ment was expected. The chart shows that this hap-
pened with ten-year government bonds in the months
before the set of member countries was determined
and the conversion rates irrevocably fixed on 3 May
1998.24 A similar development must have taken place
with private debt instruments, although, unfortunate-
ly, a comparable statistic is not available.
Even Greece profited from the interest-rate conver-
gence once it was allowed to join the euro area on the
basis of doctored budget-deficit figures for the refer-
ence year 1999. Greece was allowed to participate in
the euro because it had claimed that its budget deficit
in that year was 1.6 percent of GDP. However, as
soon as Greece was in, Eurostat revised its deficit to
3.3 percent, more than the allowed threshold of 3
percent. Later Eurostat withdrew even that figure,
without offering a new one.25 Some argue that the
deficit was as high as 6 percent. In a report on
Greece, the European Commission declared that the
Greek statistical office and the country’s supreme
supervisory authority had ‘deliberately falsified’ the
statistics.26 They obviously wanted to give the impres-
sion of better compliance with the Stability and
Growth Pact. 
The current crisis is characterized by a new divergence
of interest rates. While the risk of implicit default via
inflation and devaluation has disappeared under the
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24 See European Central Bank, Annual Report 1998, Chronology of
monetary policy measures taken in the EU in 1998, p. 163 f. 
25 Eurostat, Economy and Finance, Database, epp.eurostat.ec.
26 European Commission, Report on Greek Government Deficit and
Debt Statistics, Brussels, 8 January 2010, epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.countries suffering under the
consequences of the world finan-
cial crisis, demanding compensa-
tion through higher interest rates.
Not only for Greece, but also for
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, and
to some extent even for Italy,
interest rates rose up to 7 May
2010, the day before the bailout
decisions of the EU countries.
After this agreement, the inter-
est-rate spreads did decrease for a
while compared to the German
benchmark, but after only a few
weeks they were again on the rise
with some easing in the weeks
before the European summer
holiday season.
Figure 4 shows why not only
France but also many other
countries regarded the interest
rate development as alarming.
Before the introduction of the euro, they had suffered
very much from the high interest rates that they had
to offer to skeptical international investors. At that
time the interest premia on government debt that the
investors required was the main reason for these
countries to want to introduce the euro. They wanted
to enjoy the same low interest rates with which
Germany was able to satisfy its creditors. The calcu-
lation seemed to have paid off, because since 1998 the
interest-rate premia over German rates had in fact
nearly disappeared. Nevertheless, now with the
European debt crisis, the former circumstances
threatened to return. The advantages promised by the
euro, and which it also delivered for some time, dwin-
dled away. This and nothing else was the reason for
the crisis atmosphere in the debtor countries. The
alarm felt by these countries, linked with the fear of
further losses on government bonds in the creditor
countries, fuelled the political pressure that led to the
rescue actions. 
Figure 4, in conjunction with Figures 2 and 3, clearly
shows that there was no crisis of the euro itself, but
only a crisis in those creditor countries that faced high
losses, or debtor countries that expected high interest
rates on new bond issues. The alarm was subjectively
understandable. However, there was no systemic crisis
justifying the application of Article 122 of the EU
Treaty. At no point in time was the euro economically
endangered.
Table 2 gives a more precise meaning to these state-
ments in that it depicts the numerical magnitudes of
the interest spreads of the euro states protected by the
EFSF in the various time periods. While the mean
weighted interest spread of these euro states (except
Greece and Germany) relative to Germany was
1.08 percentage points on 7 May 2010, it had been
2.6 percentage points in 1995, before the euro was
introduced, which was more than twice as high. 
The table shows that in the first few days after the
rescue measures the spreads declined somewhat. The
minimum average spread was 0.64 on 13 May 2010.
However, the average spread soon began to rise
again. A possible reason was a lack of credibility of
the rescue measures, which can be attributed to their
being limited to only three years and possibly also to
the more than disturbing circumstances under which
France had twisted Germany’s arms and the pitiful
reactions of Germany’s political class. The lack of
agreement between Europe’s two biggest countries
did not provide a basis for hoping that the rescue
pact will be prolonged in its current generous form
beyond the three years stipulated in the Framework
Agreement. For sure, the two governments will work
hard over the summer of 2010 to come up with a
unanimously supported joint proposal for a prolon-
gation of the pact, aimed at publicly demonstrating
the strength and invulnerability of the Franco-
German axis. 
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As it turned out, the spreads increased after the res-
cue measures to levels higher than before such mea-
sures were agreed. On 8 June the spread reached a
maximum of 1.26 percentage points, and throughout
June it was hovering around an average of 1.1. By the
end of the month it was 1.14. All this was signifi-
cantly more than on Friday, 7 May, the day it was
feared that the world would go under unless the res-
cue measures were agreed to immediately. If the
world was about to go under at a spread of
1.08 points, then it should have gone under many
times over in June 2010 – but it did not. This con-
firms the view that some of Europe’s leaders may
have overly dramatized the crisis, while others may
have been overly frightened. 
Many claimed that there was a conspiracy of specu-
lators that had purposely sought to depress the value
of government bonds issued in the eurozone. The
German federal government also went along with
this explanation of the crisis. It is said that this infor-
mation had come from intelligence services. But no
evidence was released that could have justified the
empirical significance of such speculators. It is true
that the growing anxiety over national insolvencies
and debt moratoriums, as well as the subordinating
positioning of their claims to those of the IMF, led
investors to reassess the risks. However, this was a
natural development in the capital markets and not a
conspiracy. What most country representatives inter-
preted as a euro crisis was a necessary differentiation
of interest rates based on the creditworthiness of the
borrowers that was moving again in the direction of
the pre-euro era, though in no way near the spreads
existing at that time.
A second Lehman Brothers?
It has often been argued that the crisis had the poten-
tial to result in distortions similar to the insolvency of
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. However,
the similarity is only superficial, since the Lehman
disaster had induced countries to establish bank res-
cue systems that were fully operative when the
European debt crisis struck and would therefore again
have prevented banks from defaulting. 
The Lehman Brothers collapse triggered an interbank
market collapse because an event had happened,
namely the bankruptcy of a systemically relevant
bank, that had hitherto been deemed impossible.
Suddenly, banks stopped trusting one another. As
lending involved the risk of losing money, banks pre-
ferred to keep their funds in liquid form, and the flow
of savings towards final investors was interrupted. A
credit squeeze transferred the financial problems to
the real economy. 
This problem was resolved when the G7 governments
formally agreed, in their meeting in Washington on
11 October 2008, that they would henceforth rescue
all systemically relevant banks should they run into
trouble. This agreement rapidly unfroze the capital
market and solved the crisis at the time, and it would
also have prevented a new one. As the promises have
not yet expired and rescue funds were still in place on
7 May 2010, a breakdown of the European interbank
market after the turbulences of that day would have
been impossible. Had the community of states not
offered to help with the joint rescue measures agreed
on 8/9 May, each single state would have been obliged
to save its own banks. In Germany, for example, an
unused stock of 50 billion euros was readily available
with the SoFFin, the German banking rescue fund, to
acquire ownership in banks by injecting new equity
capital. Moreover, all the other rescue measures
installed after the Lehman debacle were still in place.
Similar provisions that would have safely excluded a
breakdown of the inter-banking market for sure exist-
ed in France and the other EU countries that were
indirectly affected by the crisis in Europe’s south-
western periphery. 
If anything, the parallel to the Lehman Brothers case
could haven been justified only insofar as there was
the risk of the Greek insolvency triggering a chain
reaction that would have led to the insolvency of
Portugal, Spain, Ireland and, in the end, Italy. It is
debatable how large this risk really was. After all,
Spain and Ireland have debt-to-GDP ratios signifi-
cantly lower than those of Germany and France, and
even Portugal is better than France in this regard.
Even if the Irish and Spanish debt had nevertheless
caused a problem, these countries could have easily
raised their taxes to reduce their budget deficits. It is a
bit difficult to understand why highly indebted coun-
tries should have been needed to bail out low-debt
countries to prevent an uncontrollable development
of the European crisis. 
Still, given the market reactions, the fear was not
entirely unfounded, and hence it might have been
advisable to provide at least some help to the endan-
gered countries. However, the question is whether it
was necessary to design the bailout measures so as tomaximize the protection of banks rather than the sup-
port of the troubled countries themselves.
The alternatives
Politicians claim that there was no alternative to the
measures taken on 8 and 9 May. This is of course not
true. There are always alternatives, and it is a matter
of choosing which one to take. 
One alternative to the policy chosen by the EU could
have been the American solution. As a rule, federal
states in trouble in the United States are not bailed
out. In US history, some states were even allowed to
go bankrupt without receiving help from the federal
government. And when New York City in the very
last minute received federal aid to prevent a formal
bankruptcy in 1975, brought on not least because of
the extensive social programs introduced by Mayor
John V. Lindsay, it was subjected to an independent
supervisory authority, the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC), that forced it to restore its
creditworthiness by running an austerity program
and pawning its future tax revenue. In light of the
fact that Europe is a confederation of independent
states rather than a union of federal states like the
United States, it was not particularly plausible to
organize a more extensive and generous bailout than
the United States would have done under similar cir-
cumstances. 
In fact, this had been Germany’s position when the
Maastricht Treaty was negotiated shortly after the
Berlin Wall came down in 1989. While Germany had
basically accepted Jacques Delors’s plan for a com-
mon currency in exchange for France’s consent to
German unification, it had insisted on waiving the
bailout procedure that was part of that plan, opting
for the American way. For this reason Article 125 of
the consolidated EU Treaty excluded a mutual liabili-
ty of EU member states, and Article 122 was tailored
to the case of natural catastrophes beyond a country’s
control. With the European rescue measures, the spir-
it of the Maastricht Treaty has been turned on its
head, and it remains to be seen whether Germany’s
Supreme Court will accept the reasoning of Europe’s
leading politicians. Currently a number of constitu-
tional complaints against the rescue measures are
pending. 
Another, probably better alternative would have been
a bailout procedure similar to the kind agreed, cou-
pled with a debt moratorium or haircut at the expense
of the creditors. In private bankruptcy law, restruc-
turing funds are not available unless a well-defined
reduction of creditors’ claims is negotiated before-
hand, so as to ensure that the help will benefit the
troubled company rather than its creditors and induce
the necessary caution in investment decisions. The
risk of losing at least some part of one’s capital is
essential for investors’ prudence and minimizing the
risk of bankruptcy in the first place. The IMF also
usually demands a haircut before granting loans to
troubled countries. 
Had the EFSF been combined with a haircut at the
expense of creditor banks, the available funds would
have benefitted the troubled countries directly. They
would have enjoyed a debt relief, and the fresh
money coming from the rescue funds would have
flown into the needy countries rather than into the
pockets of the creditor banks’ shareholders. This
would have given them the chance for a successful
restart of their economies, and it would have warned
creditors to be more careful in the future and to
demand sufficient interest premia to cover the idio-
syncratic country risks.
Sure, the higher interest rates would not have
pleased the debtor countries. But this would have to
be accepted. Every capital market needs interest
spreads that reflect the risk differences between var-
ious investments. Eliminating these spreads artifi-
cially with policy measures will result for sure in
serious moral hazard effects on the part of debtors
and creditors, undermining the market discipline.
This is the major reason why a haircut would have
been necessary. 
If a haircut were set at 5 percent per year from the
date of a bond issuance, the interest rate on the
government bonds could rise by a maximum of
5 percentage points. That is not much, but could be
enough to induce the creditors to be more cautious
and the borrowers to be reserved in taking on debt.
The debt bubble would not have expanded further,
and the pressure on the bubble would even have
receded. 
A well-defined haircut would have excluded the pos-
sibility of a panic chain reaction pulling other euro
countries into the whirl of events. A panic is possi-
ble whenever the fear of losses that go beyond all
limits arises. With a well-defined haircut, followed
by a rescue program of the kind agreed by the EU
CESifo Forum 2010 10
Special IssueCESifo Forum 2010 11
Special Issue
countries, no panic could have emerged, and yet the
beneficial disciplinary effects on creditors would
have come about.
Policy-makers may hope that they will be able to dis-
cipline the debtor countries also with reporting
obligations and regulations. However, the history of
the Stability and Growth Pact shows that these
hopes are not very well-founded. While an improve-
ment of the Pact is certainly necessary, nothing dis-
ciplines the debtors more than the fear of interest-
rate increases in reaction to unsound budget policies.
The euro rescue pact should not have abandoned this
instrument.
As the pact is formulated, it is an incalculable risk
for the euro. It will lead to a further enlargement of
the European debt bubble and will subsequently
induce transfer payments to the debtor countries, as
this will be the only way to prevent the bubble from
bursting. Europe is now embarked on the path to a
transfer union.
The lack of a haircut is the fundamental policy mis-
take made over the weekend of 8/9 May 2010. If it
was not a deliberate policy decision to rescue the
French banking system, this mistake can possibly be
explained by the lack of time for the negotiations. It
is difficult if not impossible to come up with a
thought-through proposal within 48 hours of time.
The inconsistencies and contradictions of the bail-
out treaty explained above have already demonstrat-
ed the great confusion that must have prevailed
among the European countries over that weekend.
Rather than arguing that an agreement had to be
signed before Monday morning when the stock mar-
kets opened, the stock markets could have been kept
closed for a week to allow the European leaders to
come up with a more carefully designed agreement.
And if, as the EU leaders claimed, the euro or the
government bonds of some European countries were
really threatened by speculative attacks, the leaders
could have forbidden short sales, similar to the deci-
sion the German government took unilaterally on
18 May 2010. This might even have resolved the situ-
ation, and if not, it would have bought time to come
up with a more meaningful agreement. 
Two theories of how the euro changed Europe’s 
economy 
To understand the economic significance of the cur-
rent euro crisis and the rescue packages for Europe, it
is useful to first look backwards and understand how
the euro has reshaped the landscape of Europe. There
is an optimistic and a pessimistic theory of what has
happened.
According to the optimistic theory, the pre-euro inter-
est spreads were a sign of inefficiency as they resulted
from an unnecessary exchange rate uncertainty that
had effectively separated capital markets and that was
removed by introducing the euro. The interest conver-
gence under the euro and the creation of a common
European capital market improved the allocation of
capital in the eurozone and stimulated aggregate
growth in Europe. 
According to the pessimistic theory, the pre-euro
interest spreads reflected differing national inflation
rates and corresponding expectations of currency
devaluations. When the euro came, the devaluation
expectation disappeared, and hence interest rates con-
verged. However, this was a mistake insofar as
investors had not anticipated that the devaluation risk
had now simply been replaced with a formal default
risk for private and public creditors. During the crisis,
investors became aware of this mistake and adjusted
their interest claims accordingly. 
According to the optimistic theory, national differ-
ences in inflation rates do not pose a problem but
are part of an efficient development of the
European economy. They are simply equilibrium-
relative price changes that result from an interna-
tional convergence of productivities, wages and
prices.27 The divergences of national inflation rates
are part of the respective true national marginal
products of capital that must be equated in order to
achieve an intertemporal Pareto optimum, accord-
ing to the seminal theorem of Dorfman, Samuelson
and Solow.28 Hence, the euro is a means to bring
about an efficient allocation of capital in Europe by
inducing an international convergence in nominal
27 Such a convergence would take place, for example, via the so-called
Balassa-Samuelson effect. The Balassa-Samuelson effect says that an
open economy catching up with more developed economies has a
higher inflation rate as productivity convergence in the manufactur-
ing of traded goods translates into a wage and price convergence.
While the prices of manufactured goods are determined internation-
ally, the prices of non-traded goods such as the prices of real estate
and local services increase with the wages determined by the produc-
tivity in manufacturing. See B. Balassa, “The Purchasing Power
Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Political Economy 72,
1964, pp. 584–596, and P. A. Samuelson, “Theoretical Notes on
Trade Problems”, Review of Economics and Statistics 46, 1964,
pp. 145–154. For an introduction of this theme into the euro debate
see H.-W. Sinn and M. Reutter, The Minimum Inflation Rate for
Euroland, CESifo Working Paper No. 377, 2000 and NBER Working
Paper No. 8085, 2001.
28 R. Dorfman, P. A. Samuelson and R. Solow, Linear Programming
and Economic Analysis, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958.interest rates even though the
national inflation rates differ. 
Ten years ago, in an article that I
wrote with Robert Koll in this
journal, we specified this opti-
mistic theory in more detail, and
it may be useful to briefly present
the underlying logic.29 We distin-
guished between what before the
euro was the ‘deutschmark zone’
including Germany, Austria and
the Netherlands (GANL) and
the rest of the later eurozone
(ROE). The countries belonging
to the deutschmark zone had
pegged their exchange rates and
faced nearly identical interest
rates on government debt before
the euro was in place. These rates
were substantially lower than in
the other countries that would
later join the euro. The interest
conversion that the euro brought
about (see Figure 4) would in such a setting imply a
reallocation of capital that improves the overall effi-
ciency of the European economy. 
The argument is clarified in Figure 5, which compares
the actual history of Europe with a counterfactual
history had the euro not been introduced. (The figure
does not compare the Europe of today with that
before the euro was introduced because in such a com-
parison too many other things that have changed
would have to be taken into account. Moreover, it
only represents a qualitative theoretical argument and
cannot be interpreted numerically.) 
The width of the diagram in Figure 5 reflects the cap-
ital that is today available in the euro countries. The
capital used in the previous deutschmark zone,
CGANL, is measured from right to left, and the capital
in the rest of the eurozone, CROE, is measured from
left to right. The two curves depict the marginal
product of capital invested in the two regions,
MPCROE and MPCGANL, respectively. The marginal
product of capital is the internal rate of interest of an
investment project, i.e. the highest rate of interest this
project can bear without becoming unprofitable for
the investor. It is defined including the change in the
relative national price level according to the
Dorfman-Samuelson-Solow theorem. The corres-
ponding curves reflect the set of available investment
projects, ordered inversely to their marginal products.
It is assumed that in each region all investment pro-
jects are realized whose internal rate of return is
above or equal the respective interest rate, iROE and
iGANL, respectively. 
In the counterfactual scenario without the euro there
is an interest spread as shown in the figure that results
from the separation of capital markets. The capital
allocation to the two regions is represented by point
D. The distance from the left vertical to D shows the
capital invested in the ROE countries, and the capital
invested in the GANL countries is represented by the
distance between D and the right vertical. 
The introduction of the euro makes interest rates con-
verge to i*because the capital markets are now inte-
grated. A new international allocation of capital
emerges that is represented by point E rather than D.
DE is a capital export from the GANL to the ROE
countries. 
The reallocation of capital reduces the output or
GDP of the GANL countries by the area CBED
underneath the respective marginal product curve, but
it increases the output of the ROE countries by the
area ABED. As the latter is bigger than the former,
the euro obviously boosts aggregate economic growth
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Notes:
MPCGANL Marginal productivity of capital in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands
MPCROE Marginal productivity of capital in the rest of the euro countries
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iROE Interest rate in the other euro countries if the euro had not been introduced
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by improving the allocation of capital. The aggregate
output is higher by the triangle ABC than it would
have been without the euro. 
While it seems at first glance that the GANL coun-
tries are losing from the reallocation of capital as their
output shrinks relative to what would have happened
without the euro, this is in fact not true, as capital
owners from these countries who earn a higher rate of
return gain more than wage earners and other domes-
tic income recipients lose. The income of all residents
of the capital exporting GANL countries taken
together, including the income earned abroad which is
JBED, increases by JBC. Likewise, the income of the
capital importing ROE countries, net of the interest
they have to pay on imported funds, increases by ABJ.
The sum of these national gains is the increase in
aggregate output, ABC. 
Nevertheless, of course, as output shrinks in the
GANL countries, the group of losers in these coun-
tries is probably large. They include all people who do
not receive capital income such as workers and
employees as well as owners of real estate, who offer
factors of production that are complements of capi-
tal. The export of capital reduces the marginal prod-
ucts of these factors of production and hence
depresses the corresponding fac-
tor incomes. 
Despite the fact that large income
groups in the GANL countries
have been losing from the intro-
duction of the euro, the theory
presented thus far sheds a very
favorable light on the euro. By
removing the exchange rate
uncertainty it improves the work-
ing of the capital market, brings
about a convergence process and
helps Europe grow faster in the
aggregate. 
However, in the aftermath of
the euro crisis the pessimistic
theory mentioned above gains
plausibility, according to which
the differences in interest rates
in the absence of a euro reflect
the implicit country default risk
due to a systematic inflation-
cum-devaluation policy. Figure
6 illustrates this pessimistic
interpretation. The interest rate
i is now defined as the true mathematical expecta-
tion of the interest rate rather than the nominal
rate formally agreed in a debt contract. Let us call
this interest rate the effective interest rate. The
effective interest rate is the nominal interest rate
minus the expected rate of currency devaluation
relative to the deutschmark or minus the expected
default loss per unit of capital invested, respective-
ly. If, for example, the nominal interest rate is
10 percent while the annual rate of currency depre-
ciation or the annual probability of default is 7 per-
cent (implying a 50-percent default risk in ten
years), the effective rate of interest is only 3 per-
cent. Had the euro not been introduced, the nomi-
nal rate of interest in the ROE countries would be
above the one in the GANL countries (as was the
case historically, see Figure 4), but in view of the
devaluation risk this would have been compatible
with an equality of the effective interest rates. The
European economy would have been at point B in
Figure 6, which represents an efficient internation-
al allocation of capital because the marginal prod-
ucts of capital are equal. 
The introduction of the euro has prevented the emer-
gence of such an efficient equilibrium. As the euro
excludes a devaluation risk, investors feel safe.
Notes:
MPCGANL Marginal productivity of capital in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands
MPCROE Marginal productivity of capital in the rest of the euro countries
iGANL Interest rate in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands if the euro had not been 
introduced
iROE Interest rate in the other euro countries if the euro had not been introduced
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Figure 6However, they may err because they overlook the
default risk that results from the financial difficulties
of countries that can no longer erode their debt by an
inflation-cum-devaluation policy. The convergence of
nominal interest rates in this scenario in fact means a
divergence of effective interest rates. The effective rate
of interest of the ROE countries falls below that of
the GANL countries, and the ROE countries import
too much capital from them. The distorted equilibri-
um is now represented by points F, G and H. The
effective interest wedge is FG, and the stock of capi-
tal exported is EH. The output of the ROE countries
increases by BGHE, but this is less than the decline of
output in the GANL countries which is BFHE.
Obviously, the net loss of aggregate output in all euro
countries together is BFG. 
The ROE countries benefit from this development
since the effective interest they pay on the imported
capital is only KGHE, while their additional output
is BGHE, implying an income gain BGK. However,
the GANL countries lose. While they expect to
receive a rate of interest that is equal to their own
rate, iGANL, they effectively only receive the rate iROE.
Thus the effective interest income earned abroad,
KGHE, is not enough to compensate for the output
loss, which is BFHE. The net income loss in the
GANL countries is BFGK, exceeding the gain of the
ROE countries by BFG, which equals the aggregate
loss in eurozone output and income due to the misal-
location of capital. 
It is a matter of debate whether the optimistic or the
pessimistic theory comes closer to the historical
truth of the actual development that took place in
Europe after the introduction of the euro. Probably,
elements of both theories were operative in Europe
during the last one-and-a-half decades. There was a
benefit from the creation of a common European
capital market and the resulting capital movements,
but the capital movements went too far and have
thus led to a crisis. Except for Italy, the countries on
the south-western periphery of Europe overheated
because too much capital flowed to them and loos-
ened the private and public budget constraints.
Thus, a tentative conclusion is that Europe may
have started in a situation such as represented by
points A, C and D in Figure 6, where the effective
rates of interest differed (albeit not as much as the
nominal rates), but then went into a situation as
shown by points F, G and H which is characterized
by an excessive amount of capital being invested in
the periphery. 
German tango?
Many observers who have pointed to the imbalances
in the European development in recent years have
obviously different theories of the effects caused by
the euro than these in mind. They focus their atten-
tion on the goods markets rather than the capital mar-
kets and argue that countries that developed a trade
surplus under the euro were winners of the European
development. Germany, in particular is seen to have
profited from the euro. The view is often expressed
outside Germany, but even inside the country it is
shared by many politicians. 
Recently, critics of the German development have
even argued that the country should take active mea-
sures to curb its own domestic demand instead of liv-
ing on other countries’ demand. French Finance
Minister Christine Lagarde suggested that Germany
increase its wages to reduce its competitiveness,
because it ‘takes two to tango’,30 and IMF president
Dominique Strauss-Kahn argued that “in economies
with persistent current account surpluses, domestic
demand must go up, including by boosting consump-
tion.”31 The president of the French central bank,
Christian Noyer, asked Germany to look for means to
find a better equilibrium between internal consump-
tion and production to reduce its current account sur-
plus.32 There is an element of truth in such statements,
but they nevertheless seem to misunderstand the
forces that have produced the current account imbal-
ances in Europe. 
It is true that Germany developed a large trade sur-
plus that mirrored the trade deficit of other euro
countries. This is confirmed by Figure 7, which com-
pares the GANL countries, i.e. the former effective
deutschmark zone consisting of Germany, Austria
and the Netherlands with the rest of the euro coun-
tries. The GANL countries developed a current
account surplus that culminated at a value of 244 bil-
lion euros in 2007, of which 185 billion were account-
ed for by Germany alone. By contrast the rest of the
euro countries went into a current account deficit that
culminated at 280 billion euros in 2008. 
However, it is not true that this trade surplus has ben-
efited Germany, at least not for reasons that have to
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31 Closer Policy Coordination Needed in Europe, IMF Survey Online,
17 March 2010, www.imf.org.
32 IWF springt Lagarde bei, Frankfurter Rundschau Online,
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do with demand effects. A trade surplus is basically
the same as a capital export. Apart from a negligible
flow of money balances, a country’s capital export
equals its current account surplus, and the current
account surplus is defined as the trade surplus minus
gifts the country may make to other countries, for
example via one of the EU’s transfer systems. The
terms ‘current account surplus’ and ‘capital export’
have different semantic connotations that tend to con-
fuse politicians and the media, but for all practical
purposes they mean exactly the same thing. 
Germany lost a huge amount of capital under the euro
even though it urgently needed the capital to rebuild its
ex-communist east. In fact, in recent years, Germany
was the world’s second biggest capital exporter after
China and ahead of Japan. The outflow of capital has
benefited other countries, including the United States
and the countries of Europe’s south-western periphery,
which all were sucking in capital to finance their invest-
ment and to enjoy a good life. However, the outflow
could only materialize to the extent the German current
account turned into a surplus. Exporting capital means
exporting the right to dispose of real economic
resources today in exchange for receiving a return on
such resources in the future. Without a current account
surplus, no net flow of capital can leave the country. 
The only people in Germany who may have benefited
from the outflow of capital were the rich, who enjoy
higher returns on investment – provided of course
that they get their money back. The rest of the
German population suffered, and the current account
surplus definitely resulted in a loss of German GDP
relative to what would have happened in a scenario
with lower capital exports. In a recent appeal to the
German government, a group of
German economists argued that
“those who regard the trade sur-
plus and the combined loss of in-
vestment capital as a sign of Ger-
many’s strength display an al-
most tragic misunderstanding of
the underlying economics”.33
And undoubtedly, the outflow of
capital can be largely attributed to
the fact that the euro created a
common European capital mar-
ket. Both the optimistic and the
pessimistic theories discussed
above unanimously explain why
the convergence of nominal inter-
est rates that came with the euro has resulted in a cap-
ital export from Germany, Austria and the Nether-
lands into other euro countries. Whether or not this
capital export was excessive, in the rest of the eurozone
it boosted output, increased national income and
resulted in an employment boom that benefited the
bulk of the population, while it reduced German GDP
and hurt most of the German people. 
What actually happened was that German, Austrian
and Dutch savers, i.e. households and firms, brought
their savings to the banking system, which then invest-
ed them in different kinds of securities, including, for
example, US mortgage-backed securities, Greek gov-
ernment bonds, asset-backed commercial papers
issued by Irish special purpose vehicles, or Spanish
bank bonds issued to finance the country’s gigantic
building boom. 
Under the euro, Spain for the first time developed a
true capital market, in which twenty-year fixed interest
mortgage loans became available. Such a market had
been unthinkable in the past, in particular since the
interest rates on long-term loans were four or five hun-
dred basis points lower than those available in the past.
Small wonder that Spanish firms and households
made use of the cheap credit and hastened to buy real
estate. This resulted in a building boom that boosted
the whole economy. More construction workers and
local craftsmen found employment and earned money
that they spent on the purchase of domestic and
imported consumption goods. The economy went into
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33 See W. Franz, C. Fuest, M. Hellwig and H.-W. Sinn, “A Euro
Rescue Plan”, CESifo Forum 11, No. 2, 2010, pp. 101–104.financed by cheap foreign credit,
which turned into real economic
growth as investment in construc-
tion and equipment expanded the
production capacity. 
Rapidly increasing house prices
moreover made owners of real
estate richer, which meant that
some of them also consumed
more while others leveraged
their increased equity capital
and ventured more real invest-
ment that boosted the economy
even further. The real estate
market overheated and a house
price bubble developed, in which
the expectation of further capi-
tal gains created ever new pur-
chases of real estate with even
higher price expectations. While
real growth rose to unprecedent-
ed levels, increasing goods prices
reduced the country’s competitiveness and increased
the current account deficit further, opening the gates
for more and more capital imports. In the end the
bubble burst, expectations reversed, investment
stopped and foreign investors hesitated to maintain
the flow of credit due to increased default risks. 
As Figure 8 shows, similar developments took place in
the other countries on Europe’s south-western periph-
ery, including Greece, Portugal
and Ireland, and to some extent
even France, which also developed
a mild version of a housing bub-
ble. The cheap flow of credit stim-
ulated domestic construction
activities, which then fed a long-
lasting boom in the rest of the
economy resulting in growth,
inflation and current account
deficits. The developments hap-
pened to parallel those in Britain
and, in particular, the United
States which, however, were driven
by somewhat different factors.34
If the view that Germany bene-
fited from this development
because of its current account
surplus were correct, then Germany rather than the
other euro countries should have experienced a period
of rapid economic growth. However, the opposite was
the case. Except for Italy, Germany had the lowest
growth rate of all EU countries from 1995 to 2009,
and in fact, it had the second-lowest growth rate of all
European countries regardless of how Europe is
defined, if necessary up to the Urals. The comparison
with a selection of EU countries shown in Figure 9
illustrates Germany’s meager growth performance.
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Ireland, Spain, and Greece, by contrast, grew much
faster than the old EU countries, and Portugal made it
at least to the average. While Germany grew by about
16 percent in fourteen years, Ireland grew by 108 per-
cent, Greece by 58 percent and Spain by 50 percent.
Even the east German economy did not grow any
faster than west Germany’s, contrary to all the hopes
for a convergence.35 A ranking in terms of GDP per
capita shows that in the period 1995 to 2009 Germany
fell from the 3rd to the 10th place among the EU15
countries. It is true that Austria, which still benefited
from the EU integration in 1995, grew a bit faster than
the European average, and the Netherlands also had a
reasonable performance. However, taken together,
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands grew by only
20 percent in the period considered, while the rest of
the EU15 countries grew by 31 percent.
Germany’s low growth rate resulted from low invest-
ment. As Figure 10 shows, over the period from 1995
to 2009, Germany had the lowest net investment share
in net domestic product among all OECD countries,
ranking very close to Switzerland, which faced similar
problems. No country spent a smaller share of its out-
put on the enlargement of its private and public capi-
tal stock than Germany, after it was clear that a cur-
rency union would come and interest rates began to
converge (see Figure 4).
Germany exported its savings instead of using them
as loans for investment in the domestic economy. In
2008 alone, the Germans exported 60 percent of their
current savings while their net investment was only
40 percent. Total German savings that year were
277 billion euros – 111 billion euros were privately and
publicly invested, and 166 billion euros net flowed
abroad as capital exports.36 And once again, by defin-
ition, this was also the surplus in the German current
account.
It would be wrong to say that Germany’s low invest-
ment and growth is only the result of the euro. The
problem rather results from a multitude of effects that
all worked together and implied that Germany’s com-
petitiveness for investment was reduced in recent
decades. These effects include home-made problems
like the rigidity of the labour market, in particular the
high implicit minimum wages resulting from an exces-
sive welfare state which only recently had been
reduced by the reform program of the Schröder gov-
ernment (Agenda 2010). They also include external
factors such as the intensified location competition
due to the fall of the Iron Curtain and eastern EU
enlargement.37 It would be equally wrong to say that
the euro has only hurt Germany. As mentioned ini-
tially, in the financial crisis the euro has protected the
eurozone countries against the turmoil of rapidly
changing exchange rates, it has
kept the aggregate inflation rate
low, it has fostered trade and it
has helped the European coun-
tries to exploit the gains of spe-
cialization. This has benefited all
countries. Nevertheless, the inter-
est-rate conversion brought
about by the euro turned out to
be a particularly large shock in
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35 In fact, when the artificial wage increas-
es in the public sector, financed largely
from western transfers and which the sta-
tistics count as increasing contributions to
GDP, are subtracted, the east German
economy grew more slowly than the west
German economy in the period consid-
ered. The only source of statistical con-
vergence was a substantial emigration
from east Germany, which increased the
per-capita GDP values relative to west
Germany. 
36 Federal Statistical Office, Special
Series 18, Series 1.2, 1st quarter 2010
(Wiesbaden 2010), table 1.5. 
37 For an extensive discussion of these
causes, see H.-W. Sinn, Can Germany be
Saved?, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
and London, 2007.Critics such as Christine Lagarde certainly have a
point when they argue that Germany improved its
price competitiveness by having a lower inflation rate
and a lower wage increase than other countries.
Indeed, Figure 11 shows that the inflation rate of the
goods and services Germany produced was only
13 percent in the fourteen years from 1995 to 2009,
while the average GDP inflation rate of the euro area
was 28 percent. Germany’s trade-weighted real deval-
uation relative to the other countries of the euro area
was 17 percent.
However, real devaluation was not a sign of strength
and taking advantage of other EU countries’
demand policies, as is often maintained, but an
implication of Germany’s internal weakness result-
ing from its capital exports that helped finance the
boom in other euro countries. A country that experi-
ences economic stagnation internally can only
increase its prices and wages moderately. The result-
ing improvement in competitiveness stimulates the
export sector, but this is only an induced counter-
vailing effect that is unable to overcompensate the
negative primary effect by which it was caused. Had
German savings been invested at home rather than in
Greece, Spain or Ireland, Germany would itself have
grown and the increasing labor and goods demand
would have increased its wages and prices, reducing
its external competitiveness. 
Since the mid 1990s, Germany exactly mirrored the
development in the countries on Europe’s south-west-
ern periphery. While the latter had a real estate boom
with sharply increasing prices,
Germany suffered from a stag-
nating housing market with con-
stant and even falling prices.
While German unemployment
grew more and more until then-
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s
reforms turned the country
around in 2006, the other euro-
zone countries improved their
employment records until the
bursting of the real estate bubble
in 2008. And while Germany
nearly stopped investing and
exported its savings, the other
countries experienced an invest-
ment boom and imported savings
from abroad with the cited impli-
cations for trade imbalances. 
Some readers who see the connection between
countries primarily through the goods markets may
have doubts as to whether this view is valid. It is
true that over the business cycle one country’s
boom implies that the other country experiences a
boom too, because it buys this country’s goods.
This is the Keynesian contagion effect. The
economies move in the same direction, and the cap-
ital flows adjust endogenously. However, when cap-
ital flows are the driving forces, because a water-
shed between capital markets has been removed or
policy measures have changed the countries’ rela-
tive location qualities, the countries move in oppo-
site directions. The country to which capital flows
blossoms and the country it flows out of wilts. Such
is the law of capitalism.
The future of the euro economy and the economic
implications of the rescue programs
Currently, the previously booming countries of
Europe’s south-western periphery are caught in a deep
economic crisis, and Europe is struggling to find a
new equilibrium that fits to the new reality of country
risk. The crisis is similar, though not identical, with
that shaking the United States, and it will have long-
lasting implications for the western world, as budget
constraints in the previously booming countries will
be tightened for many years to come. Budget con-
straints tighten because capital shies away from these
countries as the assessment of country risk by
investors has fundamentally changed. Investing funds
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in Greek state bonds, the Spanish construction indus-
try or US mortgage backed securities is no longer seen
as attractive, since the fear of default dwarfs all
promised returns. All of a sudden investors have given
up their prior stance that country risks are only
exchange rate risks, and fears that the previous policy
of eroding the national debt by an inflation-cum-
devaluation policy that was so popular in Europe’s
southern countries have simply been replaced with the
possibility of private and sovereign debt defaults.
Investors now reckon with events they had previously
thought close to impossible, and they want to be com-
pensated for the perceived risk with corresponding
interest premiums. The increasing interest spreads for
ten year government bonds shown in Figure 4
demonstrate this effect, although it has a much wider
relevance, applying to a large variety of private invest-
ment categories, too, such as company debt, private
equity, shares and direct investment. 
In principle this is a useful correction measure of mar-
kets that stops the overheating of the capital import-
ing countries resulting from defunct private and pub-
lic debt constraints. As is well known, the Stability
and Growth Pact that the euro countries agreed in
1996 to limit the increase in European debt has failed
miserably. According to the Pact, the European debt
sinners including France and Germany should have
paid dozens of fines to the EU, but in fact not a sin-
gle country ever paid one. Fortunately, the market is
now imposing the necessary debt discipline and end-
ing the regime of soft budget constraints that was per-
meating the eurozone. Two decades earlier a regime of
soft budget constraints had already destroyed
Communism, as Janos Kornai once predicted so con-
vincingly.38 Fortunately, a market economy has self-
correction mechanisms that are alien to political deci-
sion-making processes. 
In this light, the EU rescue measures have to be
regarded with suspicion. The 920 billion rescue mea-
sures agreed in early May 2010 have reduced the risk
of country defaults and were designed to reduce the
interest spreads. They have the potential of re-estab-
lishing the capital flows and prolonging the resulting
growth period in Europe’s south-western periphery
because they subsidize the invested capital by way of
socializing the default risk. However, they ultimately
entail a softening of budget constraints and promise
little good for Europe. 
A milder problem would be a further stimulation of
capital flows which already were excessive, financing
projects with an inferior marginal rate of return. This
would slow down growth of aggregate European
GDP. The shaded triangle in Figure 6 showed the pre-
cise meaning of this statement. 
If things go very wrong, the result could be a further
enlargement of the default risk, pulling all euro coun-
tries into the vortex. What today is the default risk for
a few smaller countries could end up in a default of
the major European countries, with unpredictable
implications for the political stability of Europe. 
In this light, it can be seen as an early warning that
markets did not really trust the rescue packages,
perhaps because they were limited to three years, or
because investors saw new risks on the horizon due
to the damage done to the Franco-German axis over
the weekend of 8 and 9 May. Whatever the explana-
tion, the rescue measures currently do not seem to
be able to stop the self-correction process of mar-
kets. A month after the rescue measures were
agreed, the interest spreads were even higher than
on 7 May, the first day of the devising of the
European rescue measures (Figure 4 and Table 2),
and at this writing they are still much higher than
before the European debt crisis.
In my opinion, this means that once again a toggle
switch has been flipped in Europe’s development
which will lead to a more balanced growth pattern,
revitalizing the previously laming center. The most
plausible scenario for the Continent’s future, from
today’s perspective, looks like this: investors from the
former deutschmark zone, including their banks,
increasingly hesitate to transport the national savings
abroad, as they had done in the past to such an enor-
mous extent. The confidence crisis has led to a waning
interest in a wide range of investment opportunities,
from American mortgage-backed government securi-
ties to Greek government bonds. Due to the lack of
suitable investment opportunities and heightened risk
awareness, banks will seek alternative investment pos-
sibilities. They may try to go into natural resources or
Asia, but for sure they will also offer domestic home-
owners and firms better credit terms. This will touch
off a domestic boom in construction activity that
resembles the one in Europe’s south-western periph-
ery during the last fifteen years, if on a smaller scale.
As previously there, construction workers and crafts-
men will find new employment, and owners of real
estate will enjoy capital gains that increase their equi-
38 J. Kornai, “‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Budget Constraint”, Acta Oecono-
mica 25, No. 3/4, 1980, pp. 231–246.ty capital and make them venture into new investment
projects, which will further fuel the boom. And, of
course, an increase in prices and wages will reduce
their countries’ competitiveness and foreign account
surplus. The two curves shown in Figure 7 will again
be converging. This is what French officials demand-
ed so vigorously, but it comes endogenously as a result
of the reallocation of savings flows and the resulting
economic boom rather than exogenously through
government-imposed wage constraints. 
It is too early to really see all this in the data, because
the scenario described may last a decade or more,
and it certainly extends beyond a business cycle. Still,
first signs of the predicted turnaround are already
visible. For example, the Ifo Business Survey index
recently made the biggest jump in its fifty year histo-
ry. A significant majority of the 7,000 companies the
institute polls every month gave a positive assess-
ment of their current situation and at the same time
expressed positive expectations for the future.39 This
information stands in striking contrast to the dark
clouds that have come from the United States and
are now hanging over western and southern Europe.
Moreover, the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator for
large enterprises has been falling for a number of
months now,40 although German banks were forced
to deleverage their operations due to the write-off
losses during the financial crisis. It is puzzling to see
German banks reduce their investments and offer
more credit to German industry and homeowners at
the same time. The puzzle can be explained, howev-
er, by the redirecting of capital flows due to the
change in risk perceptions. Credit constraints
enforced by banks’ write-off losses obviously materi-
alize only in the previously overheated economies. In
Germany, by contrast, budget constraints are cur-
rently being loosened as markets have closed some of
the holes through which its savings were leaking
abroad. 
A rescue plan for Europe
There are currently strong forces in Europe that press
for a prolongation and strengthening of the rescue
plan so as to complete the socialization of the coun-
try default risk and enforce a reduction in interest
spreads to reduce the interest burden on public bud-
gets in the countries of Europe’s south-western
periphery. Some even advocate going all the way to
eurobonds, i.e. replacing regular national issues of
government bonds with community bonds issued by
the EFSF or the European Investment Bank in
Luxemburg. However, this would be the end of
European fiscal discipline and open a dangerous road
where the debtors and their creditors could continue
to speculate on being bailed out if problems arise.
Creditors would not have to care to whom they lend
their money, and even the most dubious debtors could
build an extensive consumption and investment strat-
egy on the common liability provided by the commu-
nity of states. And as all countries would pay the same
rate of interest regardless of their default risk
eurobonds would effectively imply an interest subsidy
to over-indebted countries. Creditors would receive a
protection for free for which they would have to pay a
substantial CDS premium if they bought it in the
market. The European debt bubble would expand fur-
ther and the damage when it bursts would be even
greater. The risk of sovereign default would be
extended to all major countries of Europe.
And even if the bubble could be avoided, there would
at least be the risk that the eurozone tries to keep its
public debt in check by resorting to an inflation-cum-
devaluation strategy of the kind that the southern
European countries had been following for so many
years before the euro was introduced. The eurobonds
would therefore fuel devaluation expectations for the
euro. What in the absence of the eurobonds would
have resulted in a default risk and a corresponding
devaluation of the government bonds of individual
euro countries would be converted into a regular
devaluation of the euro itself. This, in turn, would with
necessity imply higher interest rates for Europe, as
investors would demand compensation for the expect-
ed devaluations. It is true that eurobonds could bring
a substantial interest relief for some European coun-
tries because their default risk is socialized, but the
average European interest rates would be higher than
would have been the case without such bonds. 
Of course, it could be argued that moral hazard
effects on the part of the debtor countries and their
creditors could be avoided by political debt con-
straints. Indeed, there is every reason to strengthen
the Stability and Growth Pact with automatic fines
and early warning elements. However, after observing
the chutzpah with which the governments of Europe
overruled this Pact in the past, little fantasy is neces-
sary to imagine further political maneuvers to over-
come such a strengthened Pact, too.
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For the same reason, the creation of a eurozone gov-
ernment that President Sarkozy has frequently sug-
gested would be no solution. Whatever the powers are
that such a government would enjoy, it will never be
able to exert a disciplinary force on debtors greater
than the market itself. Only the voluntary flow of
credit coupled with a full responsibility of the con-
tracting parties, which includes a default risk for the
creditors, is able to keep the moral hazard effect in
check. Hundreds of years of capitalist development
have shown this. And if placing hopes in political
measures is justified, then these measures must be
defined by firm rules so as to protect the acting bod-
ies against the criticism of the parties whose toes will
be stepped on when the crisis occurs.
All of this does not mean that Europe should fully
return to the Maastricht Treaty without any rescue
plan. The absence of a rescue plan indeed made the
provisions of this treaty implausible and may thus
even have nourished the expectation of a bail-out and
the corresponding moral hazard effect which intensi-
fied the crisis. However, it does mean that the rescue
plan must involve some sort of insolvency procedure
that makes sure that the creditor bears part of the loss
before any outside help is made available. 
In the above-mentioned appeal to the German gov-
ernment, a group of fellow economists including
myself formulated a ten-point plan for a more stable
institutional framework of the eurozone.41 The fol-
lowing coincides with this plan to a very high degree. 
1. Distressed countries can expect help only if an
imminent insolvency or ‘quasi-insolvency’ is
unanimously confirmed by all helping countries
and if the IMF helps too. 
2. Assistance can be provided in exchange for inter-
est bearing covered bonds collateralized with pri-
vatizable state assets, or by loans, the yield of
which must be set at a reasonable percentage (pos-
sibly 3.5 percentage points) above the European
average. The accumulated credit thus provided
must not exceed a given percentage maximum of
the distressed country’s GDP, say 20 percent. 
3. Before assistance is granted, the original creditors
must waive a portion of their claims through a so-
called ‘haircut’. The maximum percentage to be
waived must be clearly defined beforehand, in
order to prevent a panic-fuelled intensification of
the crisis. A reasonable haircut could be 5 percent
per year since the issuance of the respective gov-
ernment bond. This would limit the interest pre-
mium demanded upfront by the creditors to a
maximum of around 5 percentage points. 
4. The budget of the state facing quasi-insolvency
must be placed under the control of the European
Commission. Together with the country in ques-
tion, the Commission would work out a program
to overhaul the state’s finances, including reforms
aimed at strengthening economic growth.
Disbursement of rescue funds must be contingent
on compliance with the conditions set forth by the
rescue program. 
5. This quasi-insolvency process must under no cir-
cumstances be undermined by other assistance
systems that could provide incentives for oppor-
tunistic behavior, in particular by such mecha-
nisms as the eurobonds. A particular risk in the
coming negotiations is that the capital exporting
countries will be pressured to accept eurobonds in
return for a quasi-insolvency procedure.
6. The deficit limit set by the Stability and Growth
Pact should be modified in accordance with each
country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, in order to demand
more debt discipline early enough from the highly
indebted countries. As an example, the limit could
be tightened by one percentage point for every ten
percentage points that the debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds the 60-percent limit. A country with an
80-percent debt-to-GDP ratio, for instance, would
be allowed a maximum deficit of 1 percent of
GDP, while a country with a 110-percent debt-to-
GDP ratio would be required to have a budget
surplus of at least 2 percent.42
7. Penalties for exceeding the debt limits must apply
automatically, without any further political deci-
sions, once Eurostat has formally ascertained the
deficits. The penalties can take the form of cov-
ered bonds collateralized with privatizable state
assets, and they can also contain non-pecuniary
elements such as the withdrawal of voting rights. 
8. In order to ascertain deficit and debt-to-GDP
ratios, Eurostat must be given the right to direct-
ly request information from every level of the
national statistics offices and to conduct inde-
pendent controls of the data gathering proce-
dures on site. 
9. Finally, in case all the above assistance and
control systems fail and insolvency approaches,
41 W. Franz, C. Fuest, M. Hellwig and H.-W. Sinn, op. cit. 
42 A similar proposal was made by the EEAG. See European
Economic Advisory Group at CESifo, “Fiscal Policy and
Macroeconomic Stabilisation in the Euro Area: Possible Reforms of
the Stability and Growth Pact and National Decision-Making
Processes”, Report on the European Economy 2003, pp. 46–75. the country in question may be asked to leave
the eurozone by a majority of the eurozone
members.
10. A voluntary exit from the eurozone must be possi-
ble at any time. 
If these rules are respected, stability and prosperity of
the eurozone will be strengthened, and the chances
will improve that the European dream we have dreamt
all our lives will become reality. 
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